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Introduction
One roadblock to furthering discussions about the moral value of love 
is the conflation of two different concepts: love and loving relationships. 
When we construe all discussions about love as being about the value 
of loving relationships, we not only overlook the variety of ways that 
love plays a role in how we relate to others, but we thereby mischarac-
terize the nature of love. The most common victims of this conflation 
are those personhood accounts of love, which hold that we love others 
in virtue of their humanity, as opposed to their particular qualities or 
the relationship we happen to bear to them. Starting from our com-
monplace ideas about love, it can be easy to hold that David Velleman’s 
view of love as “attentive suspension,” triggered by the recognition of a 
person’s rational will, is laughable (1999, 360). Similarly, when we con-
sider Kieran Setiya’s or Kyla Ebels-Duggan’s view that love is a sort of 
“appreciation” of another’s personhood, removed from their character 
traits, we may consider it to be simply false (Setiya 2014; Ebels-Duggan 
2019; cf. Bagnoli 2003; Jollimore 2011, 15–18, 25–26).
In contrast, I argue that personhood views are largely right about the 
phenomenon of love, regardless of whether they accurately describe our 
commonsense idea of loving relationships. At first blush, this apparent 
disregard of commonsense may seem like a weakness of these accounts; 
still, a chief aim of discussions about love is to determine whether love 
has a distinct moral value, separate from the values of commitment, 
marriage, shared agency, etc. In order to settle these issues, we must then 
look past cases of loving relationships.
An additional worry about personhood views is that they tie love too 
closely to respect. We can respect those whom we do not love and can 
love those whom we do not respect.1 While each personhood account 
treats the relationship between love and respect differently, they all con-
sider these two attitudes to be deeply connected. This impulse seems 
correct to me.2 Still, I am largely dissatisfied with the existing accounts 
of how these values intersect.
BK-TandF-FEDOCK_9780367332648-200244-Chp04.indd   61 12/11/20   9:21 AM
62 Getty L. Lustila 
In this chapter, I will draw upon insights from the writings of the 
18th century British moralist Damaris Masham to offer an account of 
the relation between love and respect.3 For Masham, love is nothing 
more than the pleasure felt at perceiving, or considering, the continued 
existence of another self-subsistent being.4 Respect connects to love since 
respecting another person requires, at minimum, that she is not the sub-
ject of domination. To respect another is to recognize that they possess a 
degree of authority, both over themselves and over matters of judgment.5 
Loving another is a precondition of respect. From here, one better appre-
ciates how one’s beloved expresses their personhood through thought 
and action. Masham also gives us the tools to show how autonomy, too, 
is an outgrowth of love. It is through loving another that we acknowl-
edge their autonomy; without love, respect is merely abstract, possessing 
few action-guiding qualities and little motivational force.
In the first section of this chapter, I discuss Masham’s account of 
love, which I refer to as a minimalist account. In the second section, I 
consider the extent to which love is a moral achievement. In the third 
section, I tackle the connections that exist between the minimalist 
account of love, respect, and autonomy and show how Masham’s work 
supplements other personhood accounts of love. In the fourth section, 
I examine two objections to the minimalist account of love: first, that 
all matters of intimacy seem absent from the view; second, that it fails 
to account for love as, to some extent, a discriminatory attitude. In the 
last section of the chapter, I end by considering the implications that 
the minimalist account of love has for how we ought to view our loving 
relationships.
Love in the 18th Century
Damaris Masham (1658–1708) was an English philosopher. The daugh-
ter of Ralph Cudworth, the foremost Cambridge Platonist, Masham 
received an education not enjoyed by many women at the time. She cut 
her teeth on the great rationalist philosophy of the period, including 
works by her father, Henry More, John Norris, and others. Masham also 
made the acquaintance of John Locke sometime in the early 1680s, which 
began a lifetime companionship—Locke even resided in her household 
from 1688 until her death. The details of Masham’s education, philo-
sophical or otherwise, are scant, though it is clear that she discussed 
philosophy with Locke, as there is a record of their correspondence 
(Broad 2006). Masham also corresponded with Leibniz, initially about 
her father’s True Intellectual System of the Universe (1678), and even-
tually about a number of points in Leibniz’s own writings, including his 
ideas of substance and free will (Sleigh 2005). Masham is best known, 
however, for publishing two treatises: A Discourse Concerning the Love 
of God (1696) and Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or 
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Christian Life (1705). She offers her account of love in the Discourse, 
which will therefore be my focus here.
The background of the Discourse are the writings of John Norris, who 
is largely responsible for the introduction of Nicolas Malebranche’s phi-
losophy to Britain, and in particular a work titled Letters Concerning 
the Love of God (1695), which featured a published correspondence 
between Norris and Mary Astell about love and its proper object.6 In 
these letters, Norris argues that God is the only proper object of love. 
To make this argument, Norris first draws a distinction between what 
he calls the “love of desire” and the “love of benevolence”—the former 
leads us to seek union with the beloved, while the latter leads us to 
promote the beloved’s well-being (Astell and Norris 2005, 100–105). 
Norris thinks that it is sinful to love God with a spirit of benevolence 
since God does not require our assistance or charity. More importantly, 
however, it is improper to seek union with our fellows because God is 
the ultimate source of our happiness (Norris 1693, 13, 19; Astell and 
Norris 2005, 70).7
Let us say that my friend picks me up from the airport. I might rightly 
express gratitude at his doing so and return the favor if I can. The good-
ness, however, that motivated my friend to perform this deed is, accord-
ing to Norris’ view, the product of God. Without my friend receiving the 
goodness placed in him by God, he would be incapable of such benev-
olence. And so, after I thank my friend for his generosity and perhaps 
even buy us dinner, Norris expects me to return home and express my 
thanks to God for having made my friend and for being responsible for 
the workaday goodness that exists, even in that limited and inconstant 
manner in which it does. To the extent that I feel drawn to my friend and 
find him worthy of love, it is only because of his being the product of 
God’s goodness. Norris warns us that any desire we have to conjoin with 
our fellow beings inevitably leads us into sin and disrepair.
Masham takes issue with Norris’ and Astell’s characterization of love 
and offers the Discourse as a reply. Masham argues, first, that it is 
infelicitous to posit two forms of love: love as desire and love as benev-
olence, each of which has different proper objects. For her, Norris and 
Astell tie love and desire too closely together. It may be that when we 
love someone there is a set of desires which typically follow this love. 
But one might argue that the connection between love and such desires 
is tenuous. I love a number of my friends, which causes me to desire 
their happiness, to seek out joint projects, and motivates me to spend 
time with them. But I do not always feel this way, regardless of the 
friend. It is possible that I love one of my friends but avoid the prospect 
of joint projects and limit the amount of time I spend with him. I may 
desire his happiness, abstractly, but take issue with many of his choices, 
even if they issue from his character. It does not follow that I hate my 
friend.
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It is important not to connect desire too closely with love, which gives 
rise to innumerable types of action. Instead of identifying these actions 
as expressions of love, thereby overcomplicating the concept or disre-
garding particular acts of love, we should seek to give an account of love 
as an emotion, or as an “act of mind,” separate from these considera-
tions.8 In a similar vein, Masham identifies love as complaisance, or a 
kind of pleasure or pleasing state of mind:
When I say that I love my Child, or my Friend, I find that my Meaning 
is, that they are things I am delighted in; Their Being is a Pleasure 
to me. When I say that I love God above all, I find I would express 
that he is my chiefest Good, and I delight in him above all things. 
Again, when I say that I love myself, I likewise mean by it that my 
Being is dear, and pleasing to me. To say one loves a thing, and that 
it is that which one has Complaisency in, is just the same: Love being 
only a Name given to that Disposition, or Act of the Mind, we find 
in ourselves towards anything we are pleased with.
(Masham 1696, 18)
For Masham, love is the name that we give to the pleasure we experi-
ence when considering another as a self-subsistent being, as one who is 
importantly separate from ourselves. It is important here that in love, we 
do not seek unity with the beloved or desire to possess them. In either 
case, to do so would be not to appreciate the beloved’s being. Instead, 
Masham claims that “we necessarily annex’d a wishing to it whatever 
we conceive may either continue, or improve it” (Masham 1696, 22). In 
love, we wish that the beloved continues to be itself in some meaningful 
sense: to the extent that we interject ourselves into the beloved’s nature, 
we do so only so that they will continue to exist as themselves.9
Love as a Moral Achievement
One might think of love as a moral achievement, a view that goes back at 
least to Plato. As the story goes: in love, we are taken outside of ourselves 
and led to embrace the other; what begins as a consuming desire devel-
ops into an appreciation of the beloved and the ways in which they par-
take in the form of beauty (Plato 1994, 210a–212a; 2002, 245c–257b, 
253c–257a). When we recognize our beloved’s approximate perfection, 
our desire is redirected to the aim of attaining infinity with them, either 
by reproduction or through the activity of mutual self-discovery (Plato 
1994, 206e–208e; 2002, 265a–e). For Plato, love undergoes a trans-
formation by our coming to see the other as they are—a transforma-
tion that allows us to treat them as a self-subsistent being (Plato 2002, 
251a–252a).10 On this view, love gives rise to respect only by becoming 
what it is not.
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Consider the view that in order to love someone one must attend to 
them properly—a view illustrated by Iris Murdoch’s example of the 
mother-in-law coming to appreciate traits possessed by her daughter-in-
law that she originally found to be distasteful (Murdoch 2001, 23–24). 
Murdoch presents this example as a drastic change that takes place in 
the mother-in-law; by learning to set aside her preconceptions and prej-
udices, she comes to see the daughter-in-law for “who she is” in some 
meaningful sense. Murdoch identifies this manner of attention as love. 
The transformation required to go from looking at another selfishly to 
considering them lovingly is thought to be the result of a hard-fought 
battle. As one scholar notes, the “loving look is the upshot of a difficult 
moral journey,” as the obstacles to providing this loving attention are 
numerous (Bagnoli 2003, 506).
Of course, the difficulty of this transformation can be easily over-
stated. We often have the experience of seeing others. Consider the fol-
lowing example. You leave your office to stretch your legs, intending to 
take a walk around campus before your next class. On your way out of 
the building, you pass by a classroom where your colleague happens to 
be holding a class. The door is open, and you catch a glimpse of them 
in the middle of coordinating a discussion. You cannot recognize the 
topic of this discussion, but your colleague is managing the class in a 
seemingly effortless fashion, exuding both confidence and joy as they 
field questions, giving the students just enough to whet their curiosity. 
You walk away with a smile on your face and the thought, “I really loved 
that.” When you go home that evening you might think about your col-
league; how you never happened to notice them before and how this one 
moment has caused you to see them in a new light or, in fact, to really 
see them.
One might respond that your shift in perspective about your col-
league’s teaching, or even your colleague more generally, is hardly justi-
fied by your seeing them in that moment. A momentary glance cannot 
serve as evidence for thinking your colleague is a skilled lecturer. But 
this objection misses the point. You might recognize that you do not 
have insight into what is really going on in the classroom; perhaps you 
caught your colleague in a good moment and that they spent the previ-
ous thirty minutes thinking to themselves, “why am I even doing this? 
I was never meant for this! Perhaps I should just quit.” Let us say it was 
not a good day for them. The students were overwhelmed with the mate-
rial and lost by your colleague’s lectures. None of these observations 
undercut your stated love at having seen your colleague teach, or even 
the love you experience when considering them afterward.
What you have recognized in your colleague, and what you love in that 
moment, is them and the way in which their personhood is expressed in 
the activity of teaching.11 You would not feel any differently were you 
told afterward that your colleague was, in fact, not having a good day. 
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Now, it is certainly possible that if you were to see your colleague fumble 
their discussion that you may be less likely to see them in that moment. 
You might think “What an embarrassment!” or “Well, that’s awful; I 
feel terrible for them.” In either case, you are too narrowly focused on 
the activity in which your colleague is engaged as opposed to them, as a 
person. There may be a similar result if you witnessed them succeeding 
on a particular day—you may feel jealous or self-conscious of your own 
abilities. Regardless, it seems as if the actions of others give us a window 
into their personhood.
Now, one could point out that “love” in this context is merely col-
loquial: you cannot mean that you love your colleague any more than 
a person does Yasujirō Ozu or the Bad Brains when they say, “I love 
Yasujirō Ozu’s films” or “I love the Bad Brains.” In this case, the critic 
fails to recognize that, given the difference in objects (person, film, 
album), what it means to love that thing will depend on its nature. As 
Masham points out, “our desiring of what we love, or only wishing well 
to it, or both, follow that act of Love; the Nature of the lov’d Object 
alone Determines” (Masham 1696, 24–25). If I love Ozu’s An Autumn 
Afternoon, I may desire to watch it one evening or to share it with oth-
ers; if I love my friend, I wish that they continue to be the person I 
happen to love. The difference lies not in the love but in our proper 
response to that object of our love. I do not find anything problematic 
about referring to both cases as love, even though they warrant vastly 
different responses from us.
I return to these concerns later in the chapter, when considering what 
I call the exclusivity objection in the third section, which targets the 
permissiveness of the minimalist account of love. For now, I turn to how 
this account helps explains the connection between love, respect, and 
autonomy.
Bridging the Gap
On the standard personhood account of love, love is seen as the begin-
ning of moral education. Now, one might argue that we can come to 
see that human beings possess value in virtue of their humanity by, say, 
reading Kant’s Groundwork. From this study, we might recognize that 
all human beings are worthy of certain treatment, and that their human-
ity prohibits us from acting in certain ways toward them. It follows that 
every human being deserves respect, which demands that we allow them 
a degree of autonomy over their deliberations and actions. However, as 
Ebels-Duggan points out, it is possible to affirm that human beings pos-
sess value while also failing to appreciate the moral significance of this 
affirmation (Ebels-Duggan, forthcoming). And so, she claims, in order 
to transform this affirmation into a sincere moral commitment, we have 
to come to directly appreciate the value of human beings by experiencing 
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love for another person (Ebels-Duggan 2019, 623).12 Only by our experi-
encing love for this person can we come face-to-face with their presence 
and learn to take their value seriously.
While we are not able to love each and every person, we can recog-
nize those we do not love as, nonetheless, actual or potential objects of 
another person’s love. So, the thought goes, we love some people and 
consider them worthy of respect; we recognize others whom we do not 
love as potential objects of love and as being worthy of respect on these 
grounds. We must therefore see each and every person as possessing 
value and as being the proper object of respect. In this way, love is meant 
to educate us about the humanity and dignity of our fellows, something 
which cannot be done through reasoning from principles alone.13
So, love is based in our recognition of another person’s humanity, 
which provides insistent reasons for respect and also the grounds for the 
value of autonomy. I agree with the thrust of this argument, though I 
detect a gap between the love we have for certain individuals and the rec-
ognition of others as someone’s actual or potential beloved and thereby 
possessors of value. The connection between love and respect is said to 
be made by our direct appreciation of another’s humanity through the 
experience of love. Without love, we have to settle with the belief that 
everyone is lovable. But how does this belief compel our respect? Let 
us say that I find a person to be particularly distasteful. I will assume 
that others do as well and also see this person as possessing unlovable 
qualities. The possibility that someone could love this person will not 
compel me to take them or their interests seriously, especially as I will 
see any person who loves them as mistaken, deluded, or even as unlov-
able themselves.
The problem with inferring the value of a person from the fact that 
someone could love them is that we lose the centrality of attention, 
creating the gap between love and respect. We cannot respect another 
simply on the grounds that someone hypothetically loves them, particu-
larly if we have more salient interests for not doing so. It is here where 
Masham’s account of love can help bridge this gap between love and 
respect and ground the moral value of autonomy. For Masham, love 
is the pleasure we feel when we observe, or consider, the existence of 
a self-subsistent individual (Masham 1696, 18). Our only obstacle to 
loving others is our not properly attending to them. Overcoming this 
obstacle is not always the result of great moral fortitude; rather, we often 
find ourselves attending to others in this manner even when it is least 
expected (as in the case of seeing your colleague teach a class).
The question, for Masham, is not how we extend the lessons we receive 
from loving particular individuals to people more generally, but how we 
cultivate the disposition to attend to our fellows. If we are at least moder-
ately successful in our task, we can love people more often than not, and 
so see them as the objects of respect, thereby compelling us to recognize 
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their autonomy. To see how Masham’s account of love is meant to help us 
here, we have to look back to the Discourse. Here, she takes issue with 
the idea that God is the only proper object of love. The problem with this 
position is its unintuitive nature: after all, the fact is that we do love our 
parents, our children, our friends, our lovers (Masham 1696, 18). Surely, 
God would not make us capable of such a thing if it were wrong for us to 
do so. The bigger issue for Masham, however, is the way that this view 
cuts us off from our fellows. To be detached in this manner means to be 
unable to answer to those around us.
Masham argues that when we are accountable only to ourselves, 
we engage in flights of fancy and entertain unsociable views: “the pas-
sions where they are strong, argue by a Logic of their own, not that 
of Reason, which they often and significantly enough, invert to serve 
their own Purpose. And when Religion is in the case … they can easily 
advance this so far, as to dress out an entire System, intelligible only by 
Sentiment, not to Reason” (1696, 28). When one is severed from others, 
one risks becoming an enthusiast, thereby adopting principles and sys-
tems of belief that are prejudicial and encourage our distrust of others 
and foment discord. Masham recognizes that this state is one to which 
we are all disposed. After all, there is little in our common lives that 
support the precepts of “true religion” and the dictum that one must love 
one’s neighbor as one does oneself (Masham 1696, 29). Given the oppor-
tunity, we often find convenient excuses not to extend this love to others.
We see here why the gap exists between appreciating the value of one 
person by loving them and inferring the value of another by recognizing 
that they are or could be loved by someone. If we are disposed to find 
our fellows defective or under suspicion, the inference will be blocked by 
countervailing factors (i.e., this person associates with X group or enjoys 
Y as a pastime; is ignorant, insensitive, or morally ugly). We are judging 
this person to be undeserving of love and therefore of proper considera-
tion, though we recognize that their status as such is largely contingent. 
Consider the matter of retributive justice. We might hold that causing 
pain to others, physical or otherwise, is wrong, generally, but fitting 
in circumstances where individuals deserve this treatment. We make a 
similar determination when we consider a person to be unworthy of our 
extended love. The problem is, as with retributive justice, that we are 
often unwarranted in our judgments about the desert of others. Though 
we all appeal to standards of desert, we, as Aristotle reminds us, are 
often incorrect in our application.
Because of these considerations, we need to find a way to extend our 
attention in order to broaden our commitment to the value of others, 
lest we be left with this gap. But how can this be done? It seems like the 
only option is to cultivate a disposition to attend to other people. By 
doing so, we increase the possibility that we end up truly seeing others, 
instead of considering them under the lens of our own self-interest or 
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by ignoring them altogether. One might argue that this solution seems 
hardly perfect. We cannot maintain undivided attention for all those 
with whom we encounter. In this manner, such an idea appears foolish, 
as if we are setting ourselves up to fail, or subjecting ourselves to endless 
guilt. However, respect for another person does not require our undi-
vided attention. The fact that I have been in a position to see this person 
is enough to institute a shift in my perspective. Consider the example of 
you having seen your colleague. Your future interactions with your col-
league will be altered by the experience of having seen them, which laid 
the seeds of respect. In the next section, I turn to consider two objections 
to the minimalist account of love.
Intimacy and Exclusivity: Two Objections
There are two significant objections that come to mind when consider-
ing the minimalist account of love. The first concerns the lack of inti-
macy present in the account. When we love another, the objection goes, 
we are drawn to them in a distinctive manner; we wish to be with them, 
to express ourselves in a manner we often fail to do, to share in the 
beloved’s woes and victories alike. However, the account of love I have 
sketched sees our relation to the beloved as detached and cold—as if they 
were a piece of art or music as opposed to a person. The second objec-
tion is connected to the first—when we love another, there is meant to 
be something special about this attitude. If my partner claims to love me, 
each of their friends, their entire family, and all their co-workers, there is 
something lost in their expression of love for me. I might think to myself, 
“well, this does not mean a whole lot.”
These objections are rather serious. I take it that you, the reader, have 
been in love before and are noting that your experience of having been 
so is hardly captured by the account sketched above. I concur. When I 
think of the times that I have uttered “I love you” in a romantic context, 
there is hardly anything in the minimalist account of love that tracks my 
experience. At this point, I might remind the reader that this account 
does not take romantic love as its paradigmatic case of love; I might then 
remind the reader of our problematic tendency to conflate love and lov-
ing relationships. Still, if this account of love that runs roughshod over 
our experience of romantic love, discounting one of the most significant 
forms that love takes in our lives, then what is such an account worth? In 
what follows, I hope to mitigate both of these concerns, serious as they 
may now appear.
Before confronting these two objections, it is important to point out 
the problem of drawing on cases of romantic love in these discussions. 
In this chapter, I aim to give an account of the distinctive moral value of 
love. Like in similar treatments of pride, anger, sadness, and contempt, 
it is important to differentiate love from similar sets of emotions. In our 
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experiences of romantic love—where we run across lower Manhattan to 
declare our feelings to our beloved before the opportunity to do so slips 
through our fingers—there are multiple emotions running through our 
head (e.g., anticipation, fear, excitement, joy, etc.). It can be difficult to 
distinguish these emotions from one another because we associate that 
particular cluster of emotions with romantic love, especially at its early 
stage. But these cases end up confusing the discussion. Given that we 
associate these experiences with a certain stage of a loving relationship, 
they are far from representative of the value of love more generally.
Keeping this in mind, let us return to the question of intimacy, which 
extends past romantic love, though it is commonly associated with the 
latter. In the examples that I have given throughout the chapter, there 
is little talk of intimacy. In the case that I noted above, of seeing a col-
league teach a class, there was no desire to be near them, to seek a friend-
ship with them, etc., at least not solely on account of that experience. 
One might think that this lack of intimacy is enough to disqualify the 
view. After all, on Velleman’s account, a characteristic feature of love 
is the desire to be vulnerable in the presence of the beloved (1999, 361). 
One may argue it is intimacy that marks our interactions with beloved as 
distinctive, and that this reveals the particular significance of romantic 
love in our lives.
I would avoid making too close a connection between love and vul-
nerability, as I take the latter to be a fundamental desire of all human 
beings, one that would be more frequently expressed were we not con-
cerned about rejection. In fact, one can often find it easier to be vulner-
able with strangers than with family or loved ones. Though this impulse 
may appear aberrant, one need only consider the role that a good ther-
apist can play in one’s life. An upshot of speaking with a therapist is 
receiving professional advice; still, we also find it valuable on the level of 
finding someone with whom to speak. Certain vulnerabilities may put 
undue stress on those we love, and so it can, at times, be prudent to save 
our emotional vulnerability for others. Also, complete vulnerability with 
our beloved can be suffocating. By saving some degree of vulnerability 
for others, we can resist the urge to abuse the patience of those whom we 
love, or to engage in emotional warfare with them.
Of course, not all intimacy takes the form of vulnerability. For exam-
ple, there is the warmth we feel for someone whom we love. One may 
feel this warmth at unexpected moments. Imagine seeing a woman 
swaddling a child in a crowded mall, or a couple sharing a falafel and 
laughing at each other’s terrible puns, or a man watching the sunset from 
his porch while lazily petting his dog. Each of these moments is apt to 
produce a sense of warmth and overflowing in us, provided we are in 
a position to experience them. Importantly, our ability to feel at home 
in these cases is determined by our attention, that is, whether we are 
attending to the environment and to our fellow inhabitants.
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Often, we are not in a position to partake in this experience because 
we are attending to other matters. This reality is less a vice and more a 
fact of modern human existence. We are almost always otherwise occu-
pied, which makes it significant when we are not. Notice: the intimacy 
we feel in those moments I noted above is hardly cold or detached. Like 
our experiences of art, music, or nature, our experiences of people can 
be genuinely moving. These experiences, I argue, are nothing less than 
love. And in those moments, we feel no need to intervene; to greet the 
woman, to share our favorite pun with the couple, or even to pet the 
man’s dog. Instead, we wish only that these moments persist and become 
moments for others as well. Rather than lacking room for intimacy, the 
minimalist account of love provides ample opportunity to feel genuine 
closeness with our fellow beings, though it, at the same time, recognizes 
the fragility of this experience and our difficulty of attaining it in any 
degree.
At this point, the second objection becomes salient: love presumes 
some degree of exclusivity. On the minimalist account of love, it seems 
that we may experience love for anyone at any time at all. There seems 
to be a great fluidity and variability with this attitude. Assuming that 
the account is true, it is therefore difficult to make sense of how we love 
a particular person—say, our romantic partner—differently than we do 
the man watching the sunset with his dog. Further, if we claim that there 
are particular duties of love, then our obligations will be as fluid and var-
iable as the love itself. This result would no doubt be disastrous. The most 
pedestrian point to make here is that love comes in degrees, which may 
well be true. Presumably, we are looking for some feature that type-dis-
tinguishes loving my partner from loving a stranger. Here, I argue that 
the stable basis to which we can refer is commitment, an endorsement of 
the love that we experience for another, regardless of its degree.
When we make this commitment to the beloved, we are not commit-
ting to loving them at each moment or promising never to fall out of 
love with them; we are committing our attention to them. Knowing the 
extent to which thoughtlessness and selfishness enters our lives, obscur-
ing the beloved from view, we commit to always remind ourselves of the 
person that we have seen and loved. While there may be norms for mak-
ing such a commitment, settling this issue goes beyond the scope of this 
chapter. One thing that can be noted is that such a commitment typically 
happens only in the context of a relationship.14 It would be problematic 
for me to commit myself to the pun-telling couple or to the woman swad-
dling her child. My commitment is rightly placed elsewhere, to one who 
similarly commits to me. In the case of strangers that we happen to love, 
the most it seems correct for us to do is to wish they will be loved in a 
committed way by someone else, who sees them as we have.
As we can only reasonably make such a commitment to a small number 
of people, the worries about exclusivity can be mostly set aside. Those 
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concerned about the promiscuity of love can therefore be helped by the 
thought that commitments cannot be similarly promiscuous if they are 
of any weight. Likewise, when it comes to the so-called duties of love, we 
can see now that they are no different than the duties of partiality. When 
we commit to attending to a particular person or set of people, there are 
those who are necessarily overlooked. Given the mutuality condition of 
this commitment, the relation between us and the beloved will be gov-
erned by positional duties. The question of how we fit these duties into 
a moral view that does right by constraints of impartiality goes beyond 
the considerations of love. I do not propose to settle this issue. Instead, I 
can only hope to advance our understanding of the relationship between 
love, respect, and autonomy, and of the value of love generally.
Let us take stock. According to Masham, our love for another 
is indicative of our respect for them. We appreciate this person as a 
self-subsistent being and find joy in their existence. Loving another 
means that we wish only that the beloved continues to be who they are. 
Insofar as love compels us to interject ourselves into the beloved’s life, it 
is only to this end. Often, like in the case of seeing your colleague teach 
a class, this course of action is unnecessary, though love also plays a 
role in the context of romantic relationships. I turn now to the topic of 
loving relationships.
Loving Relationships
From what I have sketched above, it may seem that on the minimalist 
account of love, the majority of our romantic relationships hardly count 
as loving. Now, I do not find this conclusion to be particularly troubling. 
Our romantic relationships are largely governed by the norms of partner-
ship. We feel jealous when our partner receives attention from another 
because we see it as threatening to the commitment made to each other. 
Love may explain our decision to make such a commitment, but there 
are countless other factors involved here, which is precisely why roman-
tic love is an object of curiosity. However, these complications make 
romantic love a poor test case for a theory of love. The deeper we delve, 
the more we recognize that our romantic relationships are distinctive 
from more workaday conceptions of love, making romance the excep-
tion and not the rule.
Still, there are lessons we can take from the minimalist account of love 
for our relationships. First, it reminds us to see our partner; second, it 
teaches us about the contingency of connection; third, it gives us a more 
realistic view of relationships. Most of us do not see the persons with 
whom we are in a loving relationship. Prudential value is a natural out-
growth of partnerships and joint projects. As such, people begin to see 
each other as useful in some regard. One person handles the bills, while 
the other does the shopping; one does the cleaning, while the other does 
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the gardening, etc. At some point the two become a well-oiled machine. 
While there is beauty to that which is useful—especially a well-ordered 
household—these two may proceed for years in this manner, into the 
years of having children, when it is all too easy to disappear into one’s 
roles. They may go days, months, or even years without recognizing 
anything awry. All the while, each are there, present to the other, ready 
to be seen.
We will surely lose the appreciation of the way our partner expresses 
their personhood if we are not in a position to see them. The constraints 
of the household may even give us reasons to obscure our vision of the 
beloved, lest we discover anything that threatens the stability of what 
has been built. We may find ourselves trying to convince our beloved 
that a particular aim—say, entering a language immersion program—is 
not worth their time. We might argue it costs too much and requires 
them to be away from home an abnormal amount. In making our case, 
we may appeal to the duties of the household, which, we will remind 
them, outweigh considerations of self-interest, all while not grasping our 
failure to see our beloved. Though we will surely continue to fall short 
even with said knowledge, we can perhaps develop strategies to mini-
mize our doing so.
One aspect of seeing the beloved as a person is recognizing the contin-
gency of our connection. This does not require us interacting with our 
beloved as potentially slipping through our fingers at any moment—such 
a perspective is unsustainable. We also need not view each moment with 
them as imbued with great significance. An attitude of radical grati-
tude is equally unsustainable, if also a bit schmaltzy. Rather, by coming 
to grips with the contingency of our relationship with the beloved, we 
appreciate the ways in which, even given the forces and distractions to 
the contrary, people are able to love one another. Because these experi-
ences of clarity are also temporary, we also know that it will soon pass 
and can only hope to find ourselves back there in due time. In this way, 
the minimalist account of love gives us a more realistic view of the scope 
and limits of our loving relationships.
There have been two recent challenges to our view of traditional, 
monogamous relationships: one from Carrie Jenkins and another from 
Julian Savulescu and Brian Earp. Jenkins argues that our traditional 
views of romantic love are suffocating (Jenkins 2017). Given our nature, 
it is likely that we can love multiple people at once, even in a roman-
tic sense. Instead of allowing for this possibility, we shame people into 
accepting a constrained form of pair-bonding that only breeds dishon-
esty, infidelity, and unhappiness. Jenkins claims that we have to rethink 
our ideas about love to allow for alternative forms of living. Savluescu 
and Earp concur, though they see another solution to the problem. They 
argue that merely allowing for the permissibility of ethical polyamory 
will not solve the problems that underlie our troubles: namely, that 
BK-TandF-FEDOCK_9780367332648-200244-Chp04.indd   73 12/11/20   9:21 AM
74 Getty L. Lustila 
people are prone to jealousy in a manner that cannot be explained by 
our norms of romantic relationships. For them, the only way out of this 
mess is to control these darker aspects of our nature through advances 
in technology (Earp and Savulescu 2020).
I welcome both of these challenges, though I think they fall short in dif-
ferent ways. By allowing for the possibility of ethical polyamory, and by 
gradually deconstructing those norms responsible for producing cycles 
of confinement and self-hatred in our romantic lives, we will not neces-
sarily make ourselves better lovers. Savulescu and Earp recognize this 
shortcoming in Jenkins’ positions, noting that the most common obsta-
cles to us having healthy romantic relationships are not social norms, but 
we ourselves. While we can work to change these norms, the impact will 
not be felt if we are unwilling to confront the more problematic aspects 
of our own nature. Setting aside the larger worries associated with the 
use of biomedical interventions to better our romantic relationships, this 
strategy also misses the mark. Both of these challenges to traditional 
romantic relationships assume that we have to place more focus on how 
to be better romantic lovers. As I have shown throughout this chapter, 
the only way we can hope to be better romantic lovers is to learn how to 
love more generally.
Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter, following Masham, that love is nothing 
more than the pleasure felt at perceiving, or considering, the continued 
existence of another self-subsistent being. As Simone Weil notes, “belief 
in the existence of other human beings as such is love” (Weil 2002, 64). 
This account of love chaffs against some of our intuitions: that love should 
be exclusive, in some sense, and that it involves a degree of intimacy. 
I have tried to meet these objections and showcase the strengths of this 
account of love: that it captures our experience of seeing others, and that 
it explains the connection between love, respect, and autonomy. In doing 
so, we let go of the idea that romantic relationships are the paradigmatic 
case of loving, but we have made room for a less celebrated conception 
of love. This love is not often the subject of books or film: it often goes 
unseen, being attributed to forces internal and external, from a cheery 
disposition to the weather. Still, it is this love that binds us.
When we learn to see others, we come to appreciate their humanity, if 
only for a few moments. If we allow ourselves to live in these moments, 
we begin to learn the lessons of attention. Only through attention can 
we become better lovers of people. The difficult part is bringing these 
insights home, to those with whom we spend most of our time, romantic 
partners or otherwise. But we cannot learn to be better lovers at home 
prior to our trying to do so elsewhere, with others we may never see 
again. Perhaps at some point our romantic relationships will be rid of 
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those most unfortunate aspects of ourselves. Until then, we can remind 
ourselves of Kurt Vonnegut’s plea in Slapstick: “I wish that people who 
are conventionally supposed to love each other would say to each other, 
when they fight, ‘Please—a little less love, and a little more common 
decency’” (Vonnegut 2010, 3). At least it is a start.15
Notes
 1. It may be necessary to have recognition-respect for another in order to 
love them. My focus here is on appraisal-respect, that is, viewing another 
with esteem or considering them praiseworthy (Darwall 1977). Certainty 
we love our children without feeling esteem for them. It would be odd if 
our love for them was conditioned on whether they were praiseworthy. 
Further, we need not view our children as valid claim-makers in order for 
them to be the objects of our love (Darwall 2004, 43, 44).
 2. Velleman (1999) is the first recent work to posit a connection between 
love and respect. He presents the view as building on Murdoch (2001), 
a claim with which some scholars have taken issue (Millgram 2004; 
Jollimore 2011). Other scholars (Setiya 2014; Ebels-Duggan 2019) defend 
modified views of Velleman (1999). I consider my own view to be largely 
following suit.
 3. For more literature on the life and work of Damaris Masham, see Broad 
(2002, 114-140); Broad (2003, 2006); Hutton (2003); Buickerood (2005); 
Sleigh (2005); and Hammou (2008).
 4. At this point one might reasonably ask, “who are the proper objects and 
subjects of love?” Masham does not consider this question in her work, 
though she would likely hold that persons are the only proper objects and 
subjects of love. I argue that her account of love is more permissive, allow-
ing for the possibility that any object is a proper object of love (which is 
to say that the only constraints on who we can love are psychological as 
opposed to normative). When it comes to the proper subjects of love, my 
sense is that the minimalist account of love is more restrictive, though per-
haps not to the degree that Masham considers. Any being with the capac-
ity to perceive other beings as self-subsistent and to consider the being of 
others as a constraint on their conduct (in some manner or another) is 
properly thought of as a potential lover. This being only counts as a lover 
insofar as they do, in fact, love.
 5. My aim in this chapter is not to defend a full-bloodied account of respect. 
I instead rely on what I take to be two uncontroversial aspects of respect 
for persons: non-domination and autonomy.
 6. The larger intellectual context for this discussion is the debate between 
John Norris and John Locke about the status of Malebranche’s occasion-
alism. For Locke, the occasionalists were little more than enthusiasts, and 
dangerous ones at that, a view that was shared by Masham: “If once an 
unintelligible way of practical religion become the standard of devotion, 
no men of sense and reason will ever set themselves about it; but leave it to 
be understood by mad men, and practiced by fools” (1696, 6–7).
 7. For more on Norris’ argument and its connection to Malebranche, see 
Mander (2008, 130–145).
 8. For a different take on how love can be construed as an emotion, see 
Abramson and Leite (2011). For a congenial alternative to this view, see 
Pismenny and Prinz (forthcoming).
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 9. For more on how we are meant to be an agent to our beloved’s interests, 
see Vellemen (1999, 353) and Ebels-Duggan (2008, 162–163). For differ-
ent, more open-ended, models of how we are meant to relate to our belov-
ed’s interests, see Bagley (2015) and Kreft (forthcoming).
 10. Presumably Alcibiades’ issue in the Symposium is that he cannot stop him-
self from wanting to consume Socrates as opposed to recognizing him as 
a self-subsistent being. However, as Socrates points out in the Phaedrus, 
being in the grips of love’s madness may be necessary for properly appre-
ciating another’s autonomy (Plato 2002, 243e7–257b6; cf. Kreft, forth-
coming). This chapter is an attempt to make sense of Socrates’ seemingly 
paradoxical claim. I argue that Masham’s account of love can get closer 
to understanding the connection between love and autonomy than have 
many contemporary views.
 11. For more on love as the “appreciation” of someone’s personhood, see 
Gaita (2004, 26–31, 146–156, 211–213). For more on the ethical impor-
tance of appreciation, see Brewer (1999, 158–163, 180, 220).
 12. Ebels-Duggan notes, “when you appreciate something directly, you may 
come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience 
in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of 
cases you could not have full appreciated the value absent some experi-
ence. In these cases, you could not have come to value the thing as you do 
merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport 
to justify your attitude. It follows that, even in the wake of the expe-
rience, you will remain incapable of fully communicating to someone 
who lacks the experience the reasons grounding your own affirmation of 
values” (2019, 623).
 13. According to Ebels-Duggan, practical reasoning operates on the basis of 
normative commitments that are grounded in the direct appreciation of 
the value of a person, object, or end: “The only way to then be fully 
rationally secure in one’s commitments is to trace such a line of reasoning 
back to commitments that are not subject to any intelligible challenge” 
(2019, 628).
 14. Kolodny (2003) provides an intuitive account of the norms associated 
with a relationship, though it falls short in offering a plausible account 
of love. While I agree with the criticisms of the account of love found in 
Setiya (2014), Kolodny (2003) presents a more reasonable model of what 
it means to act from considerations of love. Exploring this matter further 
goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
 15. I would like to thank Raja Rosenhagen, Rachel Fedock, and Michael 
Kühler, for their feedback and for giving me the opportunity to contribute 
to this volume. I would like to thank Raja Rosenhagen in particular for 
introducing me to Iris Murdoch’s work, which has been rewarding both 
professionally and personally. I would like to thank Kyla Ebels-Duggan, 
for a conversation that encouraged me to move forward with my thoughts 
on Damaris Masham. Thank you to Kieren Setiya, whose writings on 
love greatly influenced the writing of this chapter. Thank you to Aaron 
Garrett, for introducing me to the writings of Damaris Masham. Thank 
you to Lisa Shapiro and Marcy Lascano, for organizing the Intensive Sem-
inar on Early Modern Women Philosophers at Simon Fraser University, 
which gave me the opportunity to engage with others about Masham’s 
work. Thank you to Charles Griswold, for teaching me that historians 
of philosophy should contribute to contemporary debates where possible. 
Thank you to the unnamed colleague, for inspiring the chief examples 
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in this chapter. Thank you to Alexandria Yen, Malin Lalich, Rebeccah 
Leiby, Taru Auranne, and others who read and commented on the chapter 
at various points. This chapter is dedicated to Simone Weil, whose work, 
Gravity and Grace, I was reading nightly during the writing process.
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